Congress
SALARIES, PRIVILEGES AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
- A. Salaries
Philconsa v. Mathay (1966)
QF: Congress enacted RA 4134 and 4642 increasing salaries of Members of the House of Reps for the year of 1965-1966. Philconsa seeks to enjoin the Acting Auditor General to pass this in audit on the ground that 8 of the senators who enacted the bill have terms that will expire on 1969 thus, it violates Art VI, Sec 14 of the 1935 Constitution. Petition granted.
DOCTRINE: The language of the provision on salaries of Members of Congress is clear. It refers to the expiration of the full term of all the Members of both Senate and House of Representatives approving such increase. RATIONALE: To remove personal interest from the increase
- B. Freedom From Arrest
Martinez v. Morfe (1972)
QF: Petitioners Martinez and Bautista are 1971 ConCon Delegates who were facing criminal prosecutions and were arrested separately. They invoke the privilege of immunity from arrest. Petition was denied.
DOCTRINE: The privilege from arrest is not extended to license the protected to commit criminal acts. Requisites to avail privilege: 1) offense committed is punishable by not more than 6 years 2) Congress is in session
- C. Speech and Debate Clause
Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)
QF: Cabangbang is a Member of the HOR who wrote an allegedly libellous letter to the President saying involving petitioners Jimenez, Albert, and Lukban. The letter was not held to be one falling under privileged communication but it was not held libellous as well.
DOCTRINE: The speech and debate clause covers speech, acts and other forms which are deliberative and communicative in nature. Requisites: 1) done while Congress is in session 2) in the discharge of their legislative functions
- D. Disqualifications and other prohibitions
Flores v. Drilon (1993)
QF: Mayor Gordon was appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority pursuant to Sec 13 (d) of RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Devt Act of 1992. Petitioners assail the statute for violating Sec7 of Art IX-B stating that no elective official shall be eligible to appointment or designation of any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
DOCTRINE: Sections 13 and 14 of Art VI
For public office: a) created during the term of the legislator – absolute bar from appointment b) created prior to the legislator’s term – incompatible; seat will be forfeited
Practice of profession: not an absolute bar (they can appear as their own counsel)
INTERNAL GOVERNMENT
- E. Election of Officers
Santiago v. Guingona (1998)
QF: Petitioners Santiago and Tatad contest the nomination of Guingona as the minority leader. They interpret “MINORITY” as the group who voted for the losing Senate President candidate. SC ruled that this has no legal basis and that the manner of electing officers of Senate other than the Senate President was within the province of the legislative.
DOCTRINE: The selection of the minority leader is part of the internal procedure of Congress where there are no constitutional standards; it is up to the Congress.
DEFINITION: Majority– political party where most number of lawmakers belong; the vote you need to elect the Senate President
- F. Quorum
Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)
QF: 10 senators, including the Senate President walked out of the session hall when Senator Tatad was about to deliver his privilege speech. Senator Cuenco was elected by 12 senators as the new Senate President. Court ruled that 12 senators constituted the majority of 23 senators (1 was out-of-the-country)
DOCTRINE: “Majority of each house shall constitute a quorum” is different from “Majority of all members of the house”
DEFINITION: Quorum – a majority of each house
- G. Rules of proceedings
Osmena v. Pendatun (1960)
QF: Congressman Osmena delivered a privilege speech attacking the President. Congress created a committee to investigate and summoned Osmena to substantiate his accusations. Osmena failed to do so and was suspended for 15 months. Osmena went to court seeking to nullify the resolution suspending him. Court ruled that the legislature has the power to discipline its members.
DOCTRINE: The Legislature is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour because:
- 1. The Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it
- 2. The matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts
Rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997)
QF: Petitioner Arroyo challenges the constitutionality of the passage of RA 8240 on the ground that it violated the Rules of Proceedings of the House. Court held that the Rules of Proceedings are merely internal in nature rather than constitutional requirements for enacting a law.
DOCTRINE: The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power; always subject to be exercised by the House. A legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with rules.
Notes from discussion: The Court will not interfere with rules of proceedings unless: 1. Unconstitutional; 2. Infringes on rights of third parties
- H. Discipline of members
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001)
QF: Petitioner Santiago committed a violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) when she was still a CID officer and a case against her was filed before the Sandiganbayan while she was already a senator. She was suspended for 90 days.
DOCTRINE: The power of Sandiganbayan is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks; suspension made by Congress is punitive.
De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan (2002)
QF: An information was filed before the SB against Congressman Paredes for the alleged violation of RA 3019. SB ordered Speaker De Venecia to suspend Rep. Paredes. Speaker did not. SB held him in contempt.
DOCTRINE: Suspension imposed by SB is not a penalty but a precautionary measure resorted to upon filing a valid information.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
- I. Police Powers
Agustin v. Edu (1979)
QF: The President issued a Letter of Instruction requiring every motor vehicle to have, at all times, at least a pair of Earle Warning Device (EWD) which will also be required in order for the vehicle to be registered. Petitioner opposes this on grounds that it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, etc. Petition was dismissed.
DOCTRINE: Intervention by the State to personal liberty or property so long as it is exercised in the State’s police power.
DEFINITION: Police power- State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare (Calalang v. Williams)
- J. Criterion of valid legislative powers
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita (2005)
QF: Petitioners assail constitutionality of RA 9337. One of their grounds is that it unduly delegates legislative powers to the President by giving her authority to raise the VAT from 10% to 12% at the end of the year. SC ruled that it is not.
DOCTRINE: Test of valid delegation: The law is 1) complete in itself (policy is set forth) 2) fixes a sufficient standard (defines legislative policy, marks limits, maps out boundaries and specifies agency to apply it and indicates circumstances under which command is to be effected)
- K. Undue delegation of legislative power
Pelaez v. Auditor-General (1965)
QF: President issued an E.O. creating 33 new municipalities. VP Pelaez challenged this on the ground that it is an undue delegation of legislative power because creation of new barrios can only be done by an act of Congress or by the provincial board upon petition of a majority of voters and recommendation of the municipal council. The act of the President creating 33 new municipalities: void.
DOCTRINE: The authority to create municipal corporations is legislative in nature. They are purely the creation of statutes. The test of a valid delegation is the presence of a statutory declaration of policy and a sufficient standard.
UP Law for Crammers 